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applied. 28 Unless congressional action is taken,29 it appears likely
that the boundaries of state-federal jurisdiction in the control
of subversion will be established only through the process of
"elucidating litigation."30
Jack Pierce Brook
CRIMINAL LAW - PROSECUTION FOR TWO CRIMES RESULTING
FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL ACT
Petitioner was convicted of assaulting two federal officers
with a deadly weapon in violation of a federal statute which
prohibited interference with federal officers engaged in official
duties.' Evidence showed that petitioner had wounded the two
28. See, e.g., International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954). In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "[T]he areas that have been preempted by federal
authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimi-
tation by fixed metes and bounds. . . . [T]he Labor Management Relations Act
'leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how
much' . . . . [T]his penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the
course of litigation." In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "The statutory implications concerning what has
been taken from the states and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature,
to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidations." 356
U.S. 617, 619.
29. At the time of this writing, 24 bills to reverse the effect of the Nelson
decision are pending congressional action. Typical of these proposed are S. 3
and H.R. 3, which propose to reinstate the jurisdiction of the states in dealing with
control of subversion. The bills further provide that Congress' intent will not be
interpreted as preempting state authority unless that intention is expressly in-
dicated.
30. See note 28 supra. The Nelson case furnishes some indication of the policy
factors which will influence the court in future litigation. "[T]he decision in this
case does not . . . limit the jurisdiction of the States where the Constitution and
Congress have 'specifically given them concurrent jurisdiction . . . [or] limit the
right of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted vio-
lence of all kinds. Nor does it prevent the State from prosecuting where the same
act constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under the police power."
350 U.S. 497, 500.
The majority seemed concerned over the possibility that state sedition statutes,
if allowed to stand, might unjustly deny to defendants the protection of certain
civil liberties. The court specifically mentioned the dangers inherent in a sedition
statute which allows a prosecution to be initiated upon a 'bill of information made
by a private individual. Id. at 507. The court was also concerned by the lack of
protection of "fundamental rights" in several of the state sedition statutes. Id.
at 508. The possibility of double jeopardy problems arising from concurrent prose-
cution was also discussed in the opinion. Id. at 509-10. These indications of the
policy factors to be considered by the court seem to compel the conclusion that
state prosecutions initiated as "elucidating litigation" must contain adequate safe-
guards for civil liberties. Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 27 U.S.L.W. 4233 (1959).
. 1. Former 18 U.S.C. § 254 (1940) provided: "Whoever shall forcibly resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any person [a federal officer] desig-
nated in section 253 . . . while engaged in the performance of his official duties,
NOTES
officers with one blast from a shotgun. He was convicted for
two assaults and given a ten-year sentence for each, the sen-
tences to run consecutively. Upon completion of the first ten-
year sentence petitioner moved to eliminate the second, claiming
that since there was but one act on his part he was guilty of but
one assault within the meaning of the statute. The United States
Supreme Court on certiorari held, Congress did not intend a
single wrongful act to constitute more than one offense under
the statute, regardless of the number of victims. The single dis-
charge of the shotgun constituted but one offense even though
two persons were injured. Ladner v. United States, 3 L.Ed.2d
199 (1958).
A serious problem as to the extent of the offender's criminal
liability arises when he kills or injures more than one person by
a single act 2 - as where several persons die or are injured as
the result of negligence causing a single automobile collision.8
Such situations are not to be confused with those in which sev-
eral deaths or injuries result from a sequence of separate crim-
inal acts occurring in one affray.4 The majority of the states
follow the rule that in circumstances where, under a single statu-
tory prohibition, plural criminal consequences result from a
single act there is in the eyes of the law but one crime.6 The
states which adhere to this position urge various justifications.
The most prevalent is that whatever the number of persons killed
or injured by the single wrongful act there is still but one injury
to the state.6 In other words since it is the state who is the in-
or shall assault him on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be
. . . imprisoned not more than three years; . . . and whoever, in the commission of
any of the acts described in this section, shall use a deadly or dangerous weapon
shall be .. . imprisoned not more then ten years."
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1948), the present recodification of Section 254, combines
assault in with the rest of the offensive actions. It now provides: "Whoever
forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with" any
designated federal officer "while engaged in or on account of the performance of
his official duties" commits a crime.
2. See People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 5 N.E.2d 474 (1936) ; Clem v. State, 42
Ind. 420 (1873) ; Berry v. State, 195 Miss. 899, 16 So.2d 629 (1944) ; Sadberry
v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 466, 46 S.W. 639 (1898).
3. See State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933); State v.
Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).
4. When a person commits several crimes at the same time or in inmmediate,
consecutive order while carrying out a single criminal design, then each crime is
considered to have occurred in a single transaction. Thus there is the possibility
of having several distinct crimes resulting from several distinct acts even though
there is but one transaction. For a good discussion see Annot., 20 A.L.R. 341
(1922).
5. For a discussion which gives the cases decided by each state on the problem,
see Annot., 113 A.L.R. 222 (1938).
6. See Commonwealth v. Veley, 63 Pa. 489 (1916) ; Sadberry v. State, 39
Tex. Crim. 466, 46 S.W. 639 (1898) ; State v. Damon, 2 Tyler 387 (Vt. 1803).
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jured party in a criminal prosecution because its law has been
breached, there is but one breach of the statute and thus only
one injury when there is a single act. Another group of states
draw a distinction between a single intent of the offender as
opposed to a so-called "plural intent." This plural intent is an
intent on the part of an offender to injure more than one person.7
According to this theory the number of crimes will correspond to
the number of persons intended to be injured.8 A third theory
stresses the idea that there must be complete "identity of the
offense" and not merely of the actY Under this view there are
multiple crimes where several persons are killed or injured since
the evidence of the crime is not identical in that the victims are
not the same. Thus when two or more persons are killed or in-
jured, though it be by a single act, the number of crimes cor-
responds to the number of victims. 0 As one writer aptly states,
these courts refuse to "put a bargain rate on multiple killings.""
In the instant case the Supreme Court of the United States
declared: "There is no constitutional issue presented' ' I2 and ren-
dered its decision on the construction of the criminal statute in-
volved. The decision followed the majority rule and was based
on two theories. First, in enacting the statute the congressional
intent was to prevent hinderance to the execution of official duty
and one act of hinderance could constitute only one violation of
the statute no matter how many federal officers were involved.'8
7. For example, in State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933),
the court was of the opinion that the divergence of authority as to whether more
than one crime results from a single act is due to the question of whether the in-
tent of the perpetrator is single or plural. They held where it is single there can
be but one crime resultingfrom one act. Thus, in cases where criminal negligence
is involved there could be but one offense regardless of the number of victims.
See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 222 (1938).
8. Using this theory cases such as Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 466, 46
S.W. 639 (1898), would have to be decided differently because there the defend-
ant fired upon four men with a shotgun intending to, and succeeding in, wounding
all four, but the court held there was but one offense because there was but one
act. Using the distinction between single and plural intent there would have been
four offenses although but one act.
9. See Commonwealth v. Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143 S.W. 407 (1912) ; State
v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937) ; Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765,
49 N.W.2d 611 (1951).
10. See Berry v. State, 195 Miss. 899, 16 So.2d 629 (1944) ; Fay v. State,
62 Okla. Crim. 350, 71 P.2d 768 (1937) ; Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 181 Va.
582, 26 S.E.2d 54 (1943).
11. Perkins, citing State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937),
where separate prosecutions were allowed for the deaths of each of two victims in
a traffic accident. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-
1954 Term -Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 358, 360
(1955).
12. 3 L.Ed.2d 199, 203 (U.S. 1958).
13. Id. at 204.
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NOTES
This is a rephrasing of the theory that where there is a criminal
prosecution the state is the injured party and one act can give
rise to but one injury to the state no matter the number of
victims. Secondly, the court stressed policy considerations: To
say there are as many crimes as there are victims could result in
punishments totally disproportionate to the act. The Court
illustrates this by pointing out that if a person "points a gun at
five officers, putting all of them in apprehension of harm, he
would commit five offenses punishable by 50 years imprisonment
even though he does not fire the gun and no officer actually
suffers injury. 14
Thus the decision results in large measure from weighing
the alternatives and applying the one that would produce the
most desirable results. It is true that this position will eliminate
the possibility of having penalties that are theoretically out of
proportion to the act charged and also of placing a person in
jeopardy numerous times when there is but one act involved.
On the other hand the position taken apparently allows "a bar-
gain rate to be placed on multiple killings." Seemingly unjust
results could be reached by carrying either view to its fullest
extent.
In Louisiana no case has squarely presented the issue of the
instant case and the few dictum statements in point are contra-
dictory. In State v. Batson15 the court upheld an indictment
which charged the murder of six persons in one count16 on the
theory that even though a single criminal act may operate upon
more than one person or thing, nevertheless, so long as it is one
act, consummated at one time, it may be charged as one offense. 17
Apparently this is in line with the majority position that where
there is but one act there can be but one crime. However, in the
recent case of State v. McDonald,'1 where the accused was
charged with two crimes when he killed two persons in a single
automobile collision, the court by way of dictum stated: "the
killing of each person was a separate homicide, a separate
crime."' 9 The cases cited by the court as supporting this rule
14. Id. at 205.
15. 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902).
16. The problem arose in the Batson case as one of joinder because the de-
fendant claimed a faulty indictment in that the murder of each person should have
been charged in a separate count, because the killing of each was a separate crime.
17. Id. at 481, 32 So. at 479.
18. 224 La. 555, 70 So.2d 123 (1953).
19. Id. at 562, 70 So.2d at 125. The defendant had been indicted separately
for the death of each person, but had been tried under but one of the bills of in-
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are readily distinguishable since they were dealing with situa-
tions in which the injuries, while arising out of a single trans-
action had resulted from separate acts.20 When the court is faced
squarely with the problem it may be that the distinction between
a single and plural intent of the offender may prove a practical
one. It empowers the courts to deal harshly with the offender
who intends multiple injuries or deaths, but would not authorize
cumulative penalties for the offender who did not intend to cause
more than one injury or death.
Hillary Jerrol Crain
CRIMINAL LAW - THEFT - A CAUSE OF ACTION NOT A THING
OF VALUE
Defendant attorney was indicted for theft of a twenty per-
cent interest in a cause of action. The theft was alleged to have
been committed by the use of fraudulent conduct, practices, and
representations in inducing the complainant to sign a contin-
gency fee contract. The contract, which the defendant recorded
and caused to be served on all parties concerned, contained a
provision transferring an interest in the cause to the accused.
It also provided that neither the client nor the defendant could
"settle, compromise, release, or otherwise dispose of" the claim
without the written consent of the other.' The district court
sustained a motion to quash the indictment. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A cause of action has only a
potential value, thus it is not a thing of value within the re-
quirement of the theft article.2 State v. Picou, 107 So.2d 691
(La. 1958).
formation. The court decided that his objection was premature regardless of the
question of whether a person can be charged with more than one crime when
there has been but one act.
20. The court cited State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 169 So. 446 (1936), where
the accused killed two women at the same time and place in "one continuous
transaction" but the homicide did not result from a single act. They also relied on
State v. Monterieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928), where there was burglary
followed by larcency involving two separate and distinct acts.
1. This provision was apparently written into the contract pursuant to the
provisions of LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950).
2. The court also held that the indictment failed to allege an intent permanently
to deprive the complainant of part of his cause of action on the date the contract
was entered into. The rationale was that while the theft was alleged in the
indictment to have occurred when the fraudulent conduct was used to procure
the contract, the bill of particulars alleged that the intent permanently to deprive
arose when the contract was recorded, which was 14 days after the alleged theft.
The majority further reasoned that recordation of the contract could not change
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